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Nietzsche's understanding of truth differs from a common sense notion 
that regards truth as the relation between what is thought to be known, 
what is understood as true and what is actually the case. According to the 
common conception, if what is the case and the understanding of it arc in 
accord, truth prevails, if they are not, then there is falsity. Most people, 
and probably most philosophers, hold to some form of "metaphysical 
realism" by which they believe that there is something definite "out 
there" (with the tropic "inside and outside" firmly operative) that can be 
understood by a knowing mind. Hilary Putnam,1 for example, defines this 
position: 
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed 
totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one 
true and complete description of "the way the world is." 
Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation 
between words of thought-signs and external things and 
sets of things" (Reason, Truth and History, 49). 
Nietzsche's theory of truth is a perspectival one, one in which the all 
knowing, determinately true, "God's eye," omniscient observer's perspec-
tive is replaced by a multitude of perspectives. For Nietzsche, the very 
notion of an overarching ultimate truth is regarded as symptomatic of a 
kind of philosopher's malfeasance. 
The problem faced by any perspectival theory of truth is that it is 
liable to the criticism that it commits a version of the fallacy of relativi-
sm-that, in claiming that all truth is perspectival, the claimant implicit-
ly evokes a universal theory of truth, in that, in order for this theory itself 
to be true, it must establish at least one universally true proposition (that 
all truth is perspectival). Such a theory, therefore, by its own measure, 
cannot be regarded as true, since, cither it establishes this one universal 
truth or the theory itself may also only be a perspective. This argument 
goes back at least to Plato's Theatetus, and is often posed against Nietzs-
che's perspectivism, as in, for example, Danto's Nietzsche as Philosopher? 
The important question here is how Nietzsche's perspectivism can get 
around this objection of the fallacy of relativism. However, one might also 
ask whether Nietzsche even has a unitary theory of truth, or whether it is 
1 For the record, Putnam disagrees with this position. 
2 Though Danto is not fully supportive of this as an argument against 
Nietzsche. 
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important that he does. Before a critical analysis of the paradox of 
relativism is given it is important to see how a theory of truth may be 
propounded from a reading of Nietzsche's texts. 
This account will proceed roughly chronologically from Nietzsche's 
early manuscript "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," through Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, "How the 'Real' World at last 
Became a Myth," from Twilight of the Idols, finally to an account of the 
doctrine expounded in The Will to Power. The point of this method of 
selection is first, to establish what Nietzsche's theory of truth is. 
Secondly, to show some of the consistencies and developments across the 
whole of Nietzsche's thought. This method is not comprehensive, nor could 
any method be given this task. In some ways the method is reflective of 
Nietzsche's own style (though with less ability), jumping from text to text, 
reference to reference, all comments revolving around a series of related 
themes. 
Nietzsche's 1873 manuscript essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense," marks an early stage of his development of a theory of truth. Here 
truth is understood as a product of language, with science being a further 
product of a linguistic method of discovery that reinforces a notion of truth 
as certainty in the face of doubt. He calls truth: 
"A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations 
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and which, after long 
usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and bind-
ing" (Philosophy and Truth, 84). 
He adds: 
"Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are 
illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out 
and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which 
have lost their embossing and are now considered as 
metal and no longer as coins" (84). 
The thrust of these claims is that truth is a collective convention, one 
that is the product of uncertain beings who occupy only a temporary place 
in the vastness of the cosmos. Truth is established as a sort of peace treaty 
that institutes uniformly valid and binding designations for things. 
Comfort is derived from this conception, in that one may cease to worry 
whether all is flux and get on with the business of life. With this 
rigidification of what is true certainty is established, and also uncertainty. 
With truth comes the possibility of the lie. By using the established 
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designations improperly one can use the language of truth to say what is 
untrue. There is no falsity outside of these linguistic conventions. 
Nietzsche claims that this origin of truth is buried under as humans 
forget that the notion of truth is a problematic one, one with a history of 
development. Humans forget that this truth is an illusory one, "empty 
husks" are considered solid. This truth is a product of metaphor upon 
metaphor. The very image we see is metaphor for a nerve stimulus, the 
word by which we designate this image is itself a further metaphor. In 
this, there is no relation to any things in themselves. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting that in this essay Nietzsche maintains a 
tension between this manner of metaphysical realism 3 and the more 
obvious rejection of this point of view. He cuts short the objection to his 
perspectivism saying: 
"For even our contrast between individual and species is 
something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the 
essence of things; although we should not presume to 
claim that this contrast does not correspond to the essence 
of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion 
and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its 
opposite (83-84). 
Thus, truth is not a lie, but truth and lie only exist in the metaphorized 
world of rigid designations. Even to say that truth is an illusion must be 
understood in a specialized sense that the image must not be taken as a true 
reflection of an absolute reality. Nietzsche denies the possibility of 
"correct perception." He defends something like the Protagarian position 
that man is the measure of all things. Furthermore, man brings to all things 
an interpretation of them. 'Things," themselves, are a product of these 
interpretations. 
Although the recognition is made that humans cannot attain to the 
thing in itself in language or perception, Nietzsche still makes reference an 
"essence of things" that is apprehensible aesthetically.4 He writes: 
A painter without hands who wished to express in song 
the picture before his mind would, by means of this 
substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence 
of things than does the empirical world (86-87). 
Nietzsche only glancingly alludes to what this "essence of things" is really 
like, and in his last works, such as Twilight of the Idols, this position is 
3 In a certain sense, that of an outside world of the really real, whatever 
that may be. 
4 This is the extent of his possible "metaphysical realism." 
38 AUSLEGUNG 
explicitly abandoned. Nevertheless the relation of Nietzsche to this "es-
sence of things" does point to some multiplicity of meaning in the Nietz-
schean text and also points to some of the difficulty in actually putting 
forth such a radical theory of truth. Nietzsche's, probably deliberate, 
ambiguity is more apparent and more understandable when one examines 
the status of truth in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
To determine a theory of truth in this deeply poetic philosophical 
work requires some effort of interpretation. We can focus on two brief 
passages from Books I and II. This is where Nietzsche most directly 
addresses the problem of truth.5 
In Book II, in the section "On Self Overcoming," Nietzsche expresses a 
thought similar to that found in "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense." 
In the context of the "will to truth" he states: 
Evil I call it, and misanthropic-all this teaching of the 
One and the Plenum and the Unmoved and the Sated and 
the Permanent. All the permanent—that is only a 
parable. And the poets lie too much. 
It is of time and becoming that the best parables 
should speak: let them be a praise and a justification of 
all impermauence (84-85). 
He continues further on: 
But this is what the will to truth should mean to you: 
that everything be changed into what is thinkable for 
man, visible for man, feelable by man (86). 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra announces a philosophy of creativity, one in 
which the new "creators" overcome the mundaneity and the false imagery 
of the all too human. Truth here, as the desire for permanent truth and 
knowledge, is a mere "will to truth," a striving for the permanent in the 
face of the impermanent. It is to be superseded by the new creators' 
celebration of the flux. This is the "will to power" in which newness, over-
coming, a fullness of life is sought over and above a drive toward collecting 
"facts." The permanent is a parable, and a lying one at that. 
In Book I of Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue," Nietzsche 
contrasts this man of knowledge, the "last man" with the one who 
overcomes him, the Übermensch. This Übermensch is an artist, one who 
5 Since Nietzsche so closely connects truth with interpretation, it would 
violate the spirit of his work to say that there is only one correct reading of 
Nietzsche on truth and that this paper performs that reading correctly or 
not. 
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boldly realizes the error of the last man. The Übermensch is open and 
aware of the discord and upheaval that is more truly real. Nietzsche 
declares: 
"I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be 
able to give birth to a dancing star" (17). 
This chaos is the other side of the will to order of the will to truth. Out of 
this chaos, and in spite of the last men, the dancing star will be born. The 
role of this chaos cannot be underestimated in the problematic of Nietzsche 
and truth. Chaos is the denial of the orderly and the immutable. To recog-
nize this chaos requires courage, the fear of it establishes the noble lie of 
permanence. In Zarathustra Nietzsche makes an artistic reappropriation 
of the effects of truth. The artist, as creator, does not set upon the path 
toward permanence, but change, not stasis, but kinesis. The effect of truth 
as a will toward truth, a drive to the solid and foundational is to be 
overcome by laughing, dancing creators who realize the impossibility of 
this. Nietzsche's recognition of this ontological chaos or flux is the 
essential element of his theory of truth. 
Beyond Good and Eva expands on Nietzsche's questioning of the "will 
to truth." "What in us really wants truth?" "Why not rather untruth? and 
unceiiainty? even ignorance?." So Nietzsche ponders. The belief in 
absolute truth is found to be one more construct of dogmatic metaphysicians, 
as part of their "religion," their "faith," "in opposite values." By this 
faith, what is true is taken to be the opposite of what is apparent, the 
apparent world is a world of falseness while the true world lies behind it. 
Nietzsche replies to this: 
Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of 
movement, too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, 
physiological demands for the preservation of a certain 
type of life. For example, that the definite should be 
worth more than the indefinite, and mere appearance 
worth less than "truth"— such estimates might be, in 
spite of their regulative importance for us, nevertheless 
mere foreground estimates, a certain kind of niaserie 
which may be necessary for the preservation of just such 
beings as we are. Supposing, that is, that not just man is 
the "measure of things" (201). 
Nietzsche's theory of truth has developed to an understanding of truth 
as a "useful error" (Will to Power). These foolish "foreground estimates" 
only pose a hope that beyond the perspectival variegation of the apparent 
lies the true, the stable and the really real. By the "faith in opposite 
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values" one believes that what is really real is not the apparent but 
something else. 
Nietzsche's "perspectivism" is expressed rather obliquely. He uses 
this word only about three times in Beyond Good and Evil, and even then in 
somewhat different contexts. To call Nietzsche's theory "perspectivism" is 
in some sense to impose an interpretation on Nietzsche's text; to render a 
stability from his fluxive, multifaceted text. One of the drawbacks of this 
project of interpreting Nietzsche is that it must impose some point of 
analysis in order to "solidify" the reading that takes place here. Thus, the 
decision is made to regard perspectivism as fundamental to Nietzsche's 
theory of truth (a theory that is itself a product of an interpretation).6 
Perspectivism states that what is true is a product of how one sees things 
and that how one sees things is different depending on who, what and 
where one is. A frog has a strikingly different perspective from a 
metaphysician, and correspondingly, a strikingly different conception of 
what is real and true. Though the point is possibly a phenomenological 
one, Nietzsche is not, first and foremost a phenomenologist. More promi-
nently he is a critic of ethics and metaphysics and a philosopher of 
creativity over and above existing social and scientific standards. In 
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche poses a new kind of thinker, a "philoso-
pher of the dangerous maybe," one who recognizes the possibility that 
perhaps all is uncertain. This thinker takes untruth as a condition of life 
and goes beyond good and evil. These philosophers recognize the 
importance of living without certainty. Nietzsche's perspectivism stands 
mainly as a position of skepticism toward dogmatic understandings of what 
is the true. 
In "How the 'Real Itruel World' at Last Became a Myth: History of an 
Error," in Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche poses his theory of truth within 
a critical discussion of the history of the metaphysics of truth. In this 
"history of an error," Nietzsche gives six stages of the way metaphysicians 
have understood the world. Of primary interest here are stages five and 
six. 
These last two stages are, arguably, two stages of Nietzsche's own 
development. In the fifth stage, the idea of the real, true world above and 
beyond the sensible, apparent world is recognized as useless, superfluous, it 
is to be abolished. This stage goes beyond stage four's positivistic bracket-
ing off of a true but unattainable world to the deniability of the sensible-
ness of this concept. Now is "the return of cheerfulness and good sense," a 
time when all free spirits run riot. This proclaims the final stage, that of 
the Übermensch, "incipit Zarathustra." Nietzsche writes: 
6 Though more support is given for this in The Will to Power, even there, 
the theory of truth as "Perspectivism" is established in a fragmentary 
way. Tying it together is a matter of interpretation. 
NIETZSCHE, RELATIVISM AND TRUTH 41 
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? 
The apparent world perhaps? But no! with the real 
world we have also abolished the apparent world! (41). 
Nietzsche calls this "the mid-day, the end of the longest error and the 
zenith of mankind" (41). 
There is a development evidenced here in the implicit theory of truth 
contained in these passages. Twilight of the Idols is one of the last of 
Nietzsche's writings. There is a recognition that the dualism of the real 
and apparent worlds is not only refuted and forgotten, but also that, as the 
real world is abolished so is the apparent world. Seemingly, up until this 
point (1888), it has been a central tenet of Nietzsche's understanding of 
truth that there is a separation between what is regarded as true, perspec-
tivally, with each language, group, culture, and point of view, et cetera, 
each making a determination of what is the true, and what is outside of all 
this—an ultimate reality, existing, if only, as a chaotic flux. One might 
ask whether "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth," in fact, con-
stitutes a denial of perspectivism? Before turning to this issue, one more 
text ought to be considered. 
An examination of The Will to Power, can serve as an important after-
note to this generally chronological account of Nietzsche on truth. In this 
posthumous collocation is Nietzsche's strongest affirmation of a perspec-
tival theory of truth. In The Will to Power Nietzsche regards truth as a 
kind of error useful to life (section 493, from 1885). A priori truths are 
considered to be merely provisional assumptions. Nietzsche writes in 
section 552: 
'Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be 
found or discovered—but something that must be created 
and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to 
overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as a 
processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a 
becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and 
determined (298). 
Ultimately what matters is interpretation. Nietzsche remarks: 
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the 
world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it 
has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.— 
Perspectivism." 
It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and 
their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to 
rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to 
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compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. (Section 
481, pg.267). 
Section 604 claims: 
"Interpretation," the introduction of meaning—not 
"explanation" (in most cases a new interpretation over an 
old interpretation that has become incomprehensible, 
that is now itself only a sign). There are no facts, 
everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive, what is 
relatively most enduring is-our opinions (327). 
Absolute, stable truth is denied. There are no "facts." Interpretation in 
the interest of preserving life is, in the final analysis, all that remains of 
the once exalted concept of truth. The question of whether these passages 
from The Will to Power "square" with what Nietzsche writes in "The 
History of an Error" is in some sense put in abeyance. What Nietzsche says 
here mitigates against the apparent monism of "stage six." Here Nietzsche 
is as critical of monism (what is suggested by "stage six") as he is of 
dualism. Still, the question of whether the abolishment of the apparent 
with the real world mitigates against a dichotomy of perspective and flux 
is a challenging one. Clearly "stage six" and the "Perspective-flux" 
dichotomy are both set in opposition to any metaphysical realism (see the 
earlier reference to Hilary Putnam). Perhaps it is helpful to question what 
the "perspective-flux" dichotomy entails. 
The initial question of this paper asked of Nietzsche's theory of truth 
was whether its perspectivism committed an undermining fallacy of 
relativism, such that it posited one ultimately true absolute fact, namely 
that all truths are perspectival. It bears asking whether Nietzsche's 
theory of truth can evade some logical problems posed to it. First, if the 
theory is perspectival, then what is each perspective a perspective of? 
When one compares an object viewed from the perspective of a frog with 
that of a giant, their perspectives are different but, by the logic of the 
notion of perspective, there must be some objective thing of which both 
perspectives are perspectives. Nietzsche denies that there is an outside 
world that is to be contrasted with an inside one. Is Nietzsche a 
phenomenalist? Does he believe only in phenomena? In fact Nietzsche is 
critical of the phenomenalist point of view. The dichotomy of perspective 
and flux presupposes that one determines what truth is from a perspective, 
that which is useful to that form of life. "Perspectivism" is, perhaps, an 
incomplete metaphor in that it must not be taken to imply that there is a 
perspective of something. Unlike the painter who paints an object from one 
perspective or another, here there is no external object. Really, there is no 
one "objective" point of view. Outside of the perspective are not any really 
real things in themselves but only an undetermined flux. If Nietzsche does 
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posit a world outside of our perceptions, it is a world of indeterminacy, 
chaos, a world gathered together into objects by those creators who recog-
nize this. 
Perhaps this is where the "Stage Six" monism and Nietzsche's 
perspectivism come together. Nietzsche avoids the dualism of a 
perceptual inner and perceived outer world. With the real world, the 
apparent world also vanishes. The apparent world is a product of the 
belief in the real world. This leads, perhaps, to a solution to the 
"paradox" of relativism discussed earlier. For Nietzsche, the world is a 
product of perspectival interpretations, not perspectives of some true world. 
The perspectives decide on how the world is, according to what preserves 
life. Nietzsche can be interpreted not as denying that there is an absolute 
perspective, or "true reality," but rather, if such a "perspective" does exist, 
it is only one of flux, the laws, objects, realities of any individual 
perspective not having been yet discovered or yet "decided" upon. 
It denies the force of Nietzsche's arguments to say that there is only 
one interpretation of Nietzsche on truth. Nietzsche's texts can be read in 
many ways. What is provided here is only one way, but one supported by 
textual analysis. Whether it is even worthwhile, for example, to speak of 
a "perspective-flux dichotomy" may be the point of the "History of an 
Error" stage six. Taken as a whole, Nietzsche's text exhibits both develop-
ments and ambiguities. To say that Nietzsche has a unitary theory of truth 
is, to a certain extent, to be anti-Nietzschcan. Nietzsche is the 
philosopher of the dangerous maybe. Like Emerson, he does not recognize 
consistency as the highest ideal. In breaking with the notion of truth as 
certainty he must allow for uncertainty, even in the understanding of his 
own writings. In Ecce Homo he writes: 
Is Hamlet understood? Not, doubt, certainty is what 
drives one insane.-But one must be profound, an abyss, a 
philosopher to feel that way—We are all afraid of 
truth (246). 
In The Will to Power Nietzsche recommends: 
An anti-metaphysical view of the world—yes but an 
artistic one (The Will to Power, Section 1048. pg. 539). 
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